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Abstract
Argentina’s crisis at the end of the twentieth century surprised economists. Argentina turned from a
“Latin American miracle” to an unprecedented failure. This article looks into the crisis stressing the role
of the exchange rate regime and emphasizes the overvaluation of the real exchange rate as a part of cap-
ital’s strategy to decompose labor and restructure capital-labor relations. Argentina’s crisis resulted from
the combination of capital’s strategic success and the recomposition of labor in the late nineties.
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The rate of profit does not fall because labor becomes less productive, but because it
becomes more productive.
—Marx (Capital, vol. III, section XIV)
1. Introduction
Why did capital accumulation falter in Argentina during the nineties even though the
country was the IMF’s most brilliant student? Why did Argentina crash even though capi-
tal’s ability to exploit labor improved on an unprecedented scale? Why did it stumble even
though global capital had in Argentina more than fertile ground for its reproduction? These
are questions that many scholars have tried to answer with little success. In general, the
blame is placed on the state for failing to push reforms far enough, or on the contrary, for
being too interventionist. However, it is clear that Argentina’s capitalist state did more than
its fair share to warrant the expanded reproduction of capital. It pushed through neoliberal
reforms far deeper than in most countries. It intervened, there is no doubt about it, but to
let capital take full control of society and not to displace it.
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In this note, I will try to provide an alternative explanation of the crisis of capital in
Argentina. I will explain how the crisis was not the result of Argentina’s lack of success in
applying the so-called “structural reforms.” I will try to show that Argentina’s crisis was
the result of the contradictory character of capital’s strategy to control Argentina’s labor
class. This strategy had as its main weapon the “convertibility plan” that included the con-
vertibility of the currency, the opening of the current and capital accounts of the balance
of payments, and the deregulation of the labor market, among others (see Carassai 1998).
I will show that this strategy was successful in its objective of increasing the exploitation
of labor by capital. However, capital’s success would become the reason for its own fail-
ure, since it would create the preconditions for its crisis.
In the following section, I will discuss the reasons for the implementation of the con-
vertibility regime and the presumed evolution of the key macroeconomic variables. I will
show that most analysts used the same basic theoretical framework when discussing the
convertibility’s future evolution. In section 3, I will comment on the assumed overvalua-
tion of Argentina’s peso, which was seen as one of the main faults of the convertibility. I
will also provide an alternative evaluation of the exchange rate policy. Instead of follow-
ing a pragmatic approach (such as the determinants approach), I will work with a Marxian
approach (following Anwar Shaikh’s work). In section 4, I will discuss the implications of
such a framework for the evaluation of capital’s accumulation in Argentina during the
nineties as well as for the understanding of the crisis of valorization of capital. I will show
that the crisis of convertibility was the crisis of capital and was not a sign of its failure but
of its success in restructuring Argentina’s productive organization. In section 5, I present
the main conclusions.
2. Convertibility, Overvaluation, and Capitalist Strategy
One of the key instruments for capital’s success in controlling labor in the nineties was
the overvaluation of the peso. The combined strategy of fixing the exchange rate of the
peso to the United States dollar while establishing the dollar-convertibility of the domes-
tic currency and completely eliminating restrictions on current and capital account trans-
actions, what was commonly known as the “convertibility plan,” induced an important
appreciation of Argentina’s peso.1
This policy not only increased the value of the domestic currency but also precluded
the monetization of the labor conflict through inflation. Now, any wage concessions by
firms would have to be absorbed by profits or by increased productivity. While overvalua-
tion of the currency put at risk many individual capitals (especially small enterprises), it
was in the interest of capital as a whole to restructure and gain greater control of the labor
process and the reproduction of society. During the eighties, high inflation was an important
expression of class struggle (Bonnet 2004). Capital, being unable to control labor’s
demands for wage indexation and facing serious difficulties in sustaining its hegemony
1. To avoid the confusion that abounds in the discussions on exchange rate, a few brief definitions are
required. The real exchange rate (RER) is an index that expresses (approximately) the inverse of the value of
a currency. A currency is undervalued (overvalued) when the RER is high (low) in relation to some equilib-
rium level. For example, the peso would be undervalued when the dollar, and thus the RER, is too high.
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over society, used its control over prices to translate this conflict to society as a whole. In the
meantime, Argentina’s economy suffered a violent and regressive productive restructuring
(Aspiazu and Notcheff 1994). Within this process, which relied on capital’s concentration
and centralization (Basualdo 2000) and ever-higher inflation rates, capital looked forward to
regaining control over labor.2 The convertibility plan was thus a means for the consolidation
of capital’s rule and not just the beginning of some new process (Féliz 2004; Féliz and Pérez
2004). The plan allowed for the consolidation of capital’s hegemony while satisfying, at least
in the short run, the interests of productive capital and financial capital (Basualdo 2000).
While the convertibility plan gave productive capital (in particular, concentrated capital)
greater control over the direct exploitation of labor-power as it allowed capital to restructure
labor processes, to find new places/spaces for valorization, and to reduce the value of labor-
power, it also gave financial capital the stability it needed to be able to obtain important short-
run profits implied by high real domestic interest rates and a massive external public debt.3
Although the convertibility plan was mainly an instrument of capital, most mainstream
economists saw it mainly as a means to put an end to rampant inflation and economic inef-
ficiency (Galiani, Heymann, and Tommasi 2003). As a means of economic policy, the con-
vertibility was analyzed as basically a neutral, even benevolent institution. After years of
high inflation and especially after the hyperinflationary shocks of 1989 and 1990, labor
gave in and accepted the convertibility of the currency and the whole set of structural
reforms (the convertibility plan) as a needed medicine for Argentina’s “illness.”4 The sub-
sequent decomposition of labor meant a reduction in its power to counter or oppose market
reforms. For many years to come, neoliberal economic policies became something techni-
cal and not political; thus, policies could not be rejected on “political” grounds.5 Capital
had reestablished its hegemony over society by turning economic policy into a nonpoliti-
cal issue (Barbeito and Lo Vuolo 1998).
As stated above, one of the most common critiques of the convertibility plan was that
although it had allowed for the reduction of inflation, the real exchange rate established at
the beginning of the plan was too low for its intertemporal sustainability (among many oth-
ers, see Canitrot 1995; Fanelli 1998; Feldstein 2002; Perry and Servén 2002; Calvo,
2. The difficulties for capital’s control over labor were reflected in growing labor conflicts. Strikes and
public protests reached their peak in 1988. According to Pozzi and Schneider (1993), the number of conflicts
between 1987 and 1989 represented more than 62 percent of all recorded labor conflicts since 1980.
3. The new hegemonic bloc constituted around the convertibility plan included mainly concentrated national
capitals and transnational financial corporations (Basualdo 2000). They participated both in the process of
restructuring of public debt and in the privatization of public enterprises and social security, two of the juiciest
new spheres for capital’s (re)production.
4. In a nutshell, labor accepted the implementation of structural reforms after having suffered the effects of
hyperinflation (which created great fear among the population) and being betrayed by their most important orga-
nization (the CGT, General Conference of Labor). The fact that the government that implemented the reforms
was led by a traditional prolabor movement (the Peronist Party) also helped to facilitate their passing through par-
liament. For more on the political economy of the reforms, see Battistini, Deledicque, and Féliz (2002).
5. In talking of composition and decomposition of labor, I follow Cleaver (1992). With the concept of class
composition, I refer to a particular structure of power within the existing division of labor. On one hand, cap-
ital tries to structure a particular distribution of intraclass and interclass power that will maintain adequate con-
trol over labor to allow for a smooth process of valorization. Labor, on the other hand (with different levels of
success), systematically confronts, rejects, and resists this control. They try to recompose the structures and
distribution of power so as to change the correlation of power against capital (Cleaver 1992).
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Izquierdo, and Talvi 2002; Alberola, López, and Servén 2004). The most widely cited sign
of overvaluation of the peso was Argentina’s growing current account deficit (Mayo 1998).
In fact, during the nineties, the current account deficit was 2.6 percent of GDP on average,
peaking at 4.3 percent in 1998.
According to the neoliberal economists (from the political Right), if market forces were
allowed to work by themselves, domestic currency overvaluation would be corrected
(Buscaglia 2001; Powell 2002; de la Torre, Levy Yeyati, and Schmukler 2002). The lack of
competitiveness of national producers would force them to reduce their prices or go bankrupt.
If they managed to reduce their prices, this would be the result of higher productivity and/or
reduced costs. In this conception, the state should not intervene within the market but has
much to do in helping firms reduce their costs, especially by reducing the direct as well as the
indirect cost of labor (Gerchunoff and Machinea 1995). During the nineties, several steps
were taken in this direction. Not only were most economic activities deregulated, but also the
state took serious steps to reduce the cost of firms, in particular labor costs. Deregulation of
the labor market was impressive, and reduction of taxes on the use of labor force was impor-
tant (Battistini, Deledicque, and Féliz 2002; Pérez 2001). Besides, the state took several steps
to generate new markets for private-capitalist businesses—in particular, the privatization of
state firms and the creation of mandatory pension funds. As an alternative/complementary
proposal, neoliberal economists maintained that a reduction in public expenditure could be
helpful in the process of price deflation (Gerchunoff and Machinea 1995).
While most critical (Left or progressive) economists in Argentina disagreed with the
idea that market forces would revert by themselves the overvaluation of the currency, in any
case, most of them thought that it could not be done without an important increase in labor
productivity in export- and import-competing industries, which would require active state
intervention (Lascano 2001; Gerchunoff and Machinea 1995; Diamand and Notcheff 1999).
Besides, they believed that this could not be done without high cost in terms of output and
unemployment of the labor force, since prices would not be flexible enough to regain com-
petitiveness within the framework of currency convertibility (Gerchunoff and Machinea
1995). However, as we will see, although the prognosis was good (market forces would not
work on their own), I believe that the economists’ framework of analysis was somewhat
flawed, for they sustained the belief that even within the convertibility, with higher produc-
tivity, the probability of the collapse of Argentina’s economy could be greatly reduced if not
eliminated (Diamand and Notcheff 1999).
To everyone’s regret, as we shall see, although labor productivity grew at an outstand-
ing rate and while GDP grew faster than in many decades, in the end the economy stum-
bled, falling into its deepest crisis since the thirties. In my opinion, it was not the lack of
success in adjusting but the contrary that caused the crisis.
3. On the International Value of the Peso
As I said, the main criticism of Argentina’s economic policy for both the mainstream
and its critics was that the peso was overvalued, as could be judged by the persistent cur-
rent account deficit. But was the current account deficit the best sign of overvaluation of
the currency? In any case, was the overvaluation of the peso a real problem for capital
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accumulation, or would the restructuring of Argentina’s capital and the weakening of labor
as a class be enough to avoid the collapse of the scheme? To answer those questions, we
need an appropriate theory of real exchange rate determination.
The real exchange rate (RER) can be defined as the ratio between the price level of
foreign production and the price level of domestic production, both expressed in a
common currency. In algebraic terms,
(1)
where p* is the foreign price index, p is the domestic price index, and e is the nominal
exchange rate (pesos per dollar). That is, when the RER is low, the value of the domestic
currency (in this case, the peso) is high in comparison with the dollar.
A common way to calculate the RER is to take as a proxy of the relevant price index
the producer price index or consumer price index of each country. In the case of Argentina,
the real exchange rate has shown the following performance (Figure 1).
Many discussions on Argentina’s RER have presented as complementary evidence of
overvaluation of the domestic currency the fact that during the nineties the measured RER
was very low compared to its level in the eighties. In the case of my estimation, for
example, the average level for the RER from 1991 to 2001 was 20.7 percent lower than in
the period from 1980 to 1989.6
Another way of looking at the problem, that was usually taken as an example of cur-
rency overvaluation, was to present the level of nominal wages expressed in dollars. An
excessively high dollar wage level would thus imply an overpriced domestic currency.
Again, Argentina’s experience showed that the dollar value of the nominal wages jumped
by 117 percent between the eighties and the ten years of convertibility (Figure 2). This last
fact, the excessive level of dollar-wages, was the most commonly used argument for the
promotion of labor market deregulation. According to this point of view, labor costs were
too high in dollar terms and had to be reduced by direct state intervention (through dereg-
ulation) or would be reduced by the “invisible hand” of the market (i.e., the pressure of
growing unemployment).
Since the evolution has been roughly the same in the long run for both estimations,
from now on I will always refer to the real exchange rate adjusted by the producer price
index (unless noted otherwise).
In any case, however persuasive the previous data might be, it is not possible to define
the overvaluation of the currency unless we can show what the right level for the RER
should have been. That is, we must compare the actual RER with the fundamental or equi-
librium RER.
The neoclassical theory states that the equilibrium RER should reflect the evolution of
some fundamental variables. These variables may include the relative money supply, the
stock of debt, the level of public deficit, the level of productivity, and so on, depending on
the theoretical model (Harvey 2001). However, neoclassical exchange rate theory is severely
flawed, as its basic assumptions (such as the so-called purchasing power parity theorem or
the full employment assumption) have been shown not to hold (Harvey 2001; Shaikh 1999).
rer = p
∗
p
e
6. This implied that the value of the peso was 26.1 percent higher between 1991 and 2001 than in the pre-
vious 10 years.
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In contrast with neoclassical RER theory, recent developments from within the Marxist
tradition provide a promising approach. In this line of work (developed mainly by Anwar
Shaikh [2002, 1999]), the real exchange rate is expected to move (tendentially) to warrant
that profit rates are equalized in regulating capitals across industries worldwide. That is, the
common-currency relative price of two sets of tradable goods will tend to follow the best-
practice vertically integrated unit labor costs of these same bundles of tradable goods,
expressed in common-currency (v and v*; Shaikh 2002).
As noted above, the real exchange rate can be defined as the common-currency 
relative price of the two sets of tradable goods. International competition will force the rel-
ative price of tradable goods, that is, the real exchange rate, to follow the ratio between
e.p∗
p
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Figure 1.
Real Exchange Rate, Argentina (Index numbers, 1991 = 100)
Source: Elaborated based on official data from the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC) and
Ministry of the Economy and Public Works of Argentina.
Note: The real exchange rate was calculated as the nominal exchange rate (pesos per dollar) times the
United States relevant price index (ppi: producer prices, cpi: consumer prices) divided by Argentina’s rel-
evant price index (idem).
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vertically integrated real unit labor costs. If we assume that there is some bundle of trad-
able consumer goods whose international prices (pct and pct*) are roughly equalized across
countries and letting pc and pc* be the general prices of consumer goods in both countries
(comprising both tradable and nontradable goods), then we can define the real best-practice
vertically integrated unit labor costs as and letting following Shaikh
(2002), we can state that
(2)
This implies, in conclusion, that the relative international price of tradable goods in the
two countries—which is the tradable-goods real exchange rate between them—will be reg-
ulated by the real labor costs of the regulating capitals of those commodity bundles
(RULC*), adjusted for the tradable and nontradable content (openness) of the consumption
bundle (Shaikh 2002).
According to this, if real hourly wages fall or hourly labor productivity increases, unit
labor costs would fall, thus increasing (ceteris paribus) capital’s profitability. This increase
rer ≡ e.p
∗
p
≈
(
vr∗
vr
)
·
(
τ∗
τ
)
≡ rulc∗
τ = pc
pct
,vr = v
pc
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Figure 2.
Real Hourly Wages and Dollar Hourly Wages, Argentina
Source: Ministry of Labor and Social Security of Argentina.
.
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in profitability in regulating capital would tend to induce increase in the supply of com-
modities, which in turn would tend to reduce prices, so that the profit rates in regulating
capitals across industries would tend to equalize. That is, the reduction in one country’s
real unit labor costs would tend to increase its RER (thus depreciating its currency) by
reducing the relevant price level within that country, other things being equal (Shaikh
1999). In other terms, the reduction in the real unit labor costs implies an increase in the
relationship between surplus and necessary labor, or a higher rate of exploitation.
It is important to highlight that within this framework, a current account deficit would
be sustainable inasmuch as the valorization of capital is possible within an economy.
Capital flows (be they as foreign direct investment [FDI], loans, etc.) will finance capital-
ist production within a country as long as it is possible to obtain the regulating profit rates
in its production. Besides, changes in the RER would not tend to solve the current account
imbalances as the neoclassical models assume. On the contrary, these imbalances will be
persistent and will continue to be financed by short-run capital flows (and/or direct trans-
ferences).7 The devaluation of the currency will not by itself correct the foreign payments’
imbalance. It will only do so inasmuch as devaluation is able to change real unit labor costs
by reducing real hourly wages and/or increasing labor productivity and/or changing the
relative price of tradable versus nontradable commodities (Shaikh 2002).
Within this framework, increased labor productivity and/or reduced real wages will
increase competitiveness, and by reducing nominal prices will increase the measured real
exchange rate. However, there is something missing from Shaikh’s framework. He
assumes that every country has some industries with some sort of absolute cost advantage,
and thus actually sets the international price of some commodities. However, peripheral
countries such as Argentina might not have capitals able to set any of the international
prices of the commodities they produce.8 Thus, for these countries, one would have to
expect that nominal price level be sticky downward. In that case, increased competitive-
ness (i.e., reduced real unit labor costs) by a country would tend to produce a general glut
of commodities within the markets in which the country’s producers participate, inducing
a generalized inability to realize the increased profit rates. On the contrary, higher surplus
labor would not be realized as surplus-value (and thus as higher profits) unless there is
market space for the sale of commodities. If prices do not fall, and reduced relative real
unit labor costs cannot be taken advantage of, relative excess production would result. In
this situation, excess capital would tend to flow out of the country, turning into the most
general expression of value (world money). The transformation of capital into world
money would imply a tendency for the domestic currency to depreciate in nominal terms.
Thus, in this case, the reduction in real unit labor costs (RULC*) would also result in the
real depreciation of the currency, although through a more indirect way. This last situation
7. As Shaikh (2002) states, since the real exchange rate is pinned (through competition) by real unit costs,
it is not free to adjust in such a way as to eliminate trade imbalances. Indeed, such imbalances will be persis-
tent and will have to be covered by corresponding direct payments and/or capital flows. Of course, this must
happen if the country sustaining a structural external deficit is to engage at all in international trade.
8. This process would imply, if the nominal exchange rate were fixed, sticky domestic prices when
expressed in a common currency. This stickiness might include typical tradable commodities (such as food and
energy commodities) but also some nontradables such as privatized public services. Of course, state regula-
tions, lack of effective competition (oligopolies), and so on might also contribute to price stickiness.
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does not seem problematic in cases of floating exchange rates. In contrast, in the case of a
country with an extremely rigid exchange rate regime (such as Argentina’s convertibility),
the adjustment process could become problematic. We will keep this in mind in the analy-
sis that follows.
4. Argentina’s Real Exchange Rate and the Crisis of Capital
Following Shaikh’s theoretical proposition for defining the long-run, tendential, real
exchange rate (RULC*), I will estimate it for Argentina and use this estimation to analyze
the development and crisis of capital accumulation in the country. I will work with data on
industrial manufacturing productivity and wages since there is no adequate information for
the economy as a whole.9
However, I will include one minor modification so as to take into account the effect of
one important fact: the steep reduction of the indirect cost of labor (taxes on labor), in par-
ticular during the nineties in Argentina (Pérez 2001). In fact, what is important for capital
is not just the direct real wage received by labor but the gross cost of hiring labor, which
includes taxes on labor and other costs of using the labor force. While the restructuring and
general deregulation of the labor market (higher unemployment and/or greater precarious-
ness in labor contracts) should work its way into reduced real unit labor cost though
increased labor productivity and/or the reductions in real wages, the reduction of taxes on
the payroll should reduce these costs directly regardless of any other change. Since labor
taxes are part of the price that capital has to pay for the use of the labor force, changes in
the payroll taxes will imply changes in RULC*, other things being equal.10
In the case of Argentina, as mentioned above, there was a strong state intervention with
regard to the reduction of payroll taxes. As can be seen (Figure 3), payroll taxes paid by
the employer fell from 38 percent of the nominal wage in 1990 to an average of 9.8 per-
cent by 2001.11
As a matter of fact, the reduction of labor taxes meant an important redistribution of
resources. It is estimated that the state lost some 25,000 million pesos (25,000 million dol-
lars, at the official exchange rate), or some 1.3 percent of GDP between 1993 and 1999,
because of reduced income from taxes on the payroll (Pérez 2002). Accordingly, in
Argentina, the real labor unit costs have fallen more than can be seen by the evolution of
real wages and labor productivity alone.
While direct labor costs fell only slightly up until the mid-eighties because of labor’s
resistance to reductions in the real wage (but mainly because of the rejection of capital’s
imposition of higher productivity, and thus, higher exploitation) and very fast between 1985
9. This being a first attempt at this analysis, I will use for both Argentina and the United States data from
each country’s manufacturing producers. The data are provided by the National Institute of Statistics and
Census (INDEC) and Ministry of the Economy and Public Works in the case of Argentina and the Bureau of
Labor Statistics in the case of the United States.
10. In my estimations, I do not consider United States’s labor taxes, since they have practically stayed
unchanged during the period under analysis (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2003).
11. The reduction in payroll taxes was not homogeneous across industries, activities, and regions. By the
year 2000, for example, industries located further away from Argentina’s capital city received greater reduc-
tions on their payroll taxes (Pérez 2001).
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and 1991 (as labor’s temporary defeat set in), in the nineties, structural reforms produced an
important increase in labor productivity while holding down real wages (Figure 4). Labor
productivity was increased in several ways. First, productivity was augmented through the
introduction of newer technology in the form of imports of new machinery; while imports
grew by almost 300 percent to more than 30,000 million dollars (Mayo 1998), the value of
imported capital goods and spare parts for machinery rose from 25 percent of total imports
in 1991 to 45 percent in 1998 (Halevi 2002). Second, the changes in the labor processes
implied the increasing intensity of labor though the reduction in lunch breaks, the introduc-
tion of multitasking by workers, and so on (Martínez 1998; Battistini, Deledicque, and Féliz
2002). Many of these changes were introduced in new collective bargaining agreements, but
many were forced in directly by capitalists (Battistini, Deledicque, and Féliz 2002).
As a consequence, while the real exchange rate may have been low during the first
years of the convertibility, according to the rough estimate already mentioned (Figure 1),
this surely changed rapidly. From the year 1991, the real unit labor costs in Argentina
descended much faster than in the United States (Figure 5).
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Tax Rate on the Payroll, Argentina
Source: Ministry of Labor and Social Security of Argentina.
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Between 1991 and 1997, Argentina’s real labor unit costs fell at an average 6.1 percent
a year (7.7 percent including reductions in payroll taxes). Afterward, the increasing diffi-
culties by capital to continue to augment labor productivity and growing conflicts over the
organization of social production (both within the factories and outside them) were only
partially neutralized by the reduction in payroll taxes.12 As an average, after 1997, the real
unit labor costs went down in Argentina at a 4 percent (6.4 percent with taxes) yearly rate
(during the eighties, the average yearly reduction was 4 percent and 3.8 percent without
including labor taxes and including them, respectively).
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Figure 4.
Labor Productivity and Real Wages, Argentina (Index number, 1991 = 100)
Source: Elaborated based on official data from the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC), the
Ministry of the Economy and Public Works of Argentina, and FIEL (private foundation).
12. Social conflict never disappeared from the scene, even though its intensity was greatly reduced during
1991–1993. However, from December 1993 (with the popular uprising “Santiagazo” in a poor province of the
country) to the generalized uprising of December 2001, there was increasing popular discontent. The reorga-
nization of the labor movement, the stabilization of the rate of unemployment, and the reduced momentum in
the drive for reforms (political opposition to neoliberal reforms was building up, both within and outside the
country) all were events that help explain the growing difficulties for capital in controlling labor and increas-
ing social productivity (Bonnet 2002).
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Since in the United States, the reduction on the real unit labor costs (in the manufac-
turing industry) was far smaller (at an average of just 2.4 percent a year since 1991),
between 1991 and 2001, Argentina’s long-run real exchange rate (RULC*) increased by
51.4 percent (from now on, indications on RULC* will refer to the estimation including
labor taxes, unless stated otherwise; Figure 6).13
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Real Unit Labor Cost Index, Argentina (vr) and United States (vr*) (Index number, 1991 = 100)
Source: Elaborated based on official data from the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC),
the Ministry of the Economy and Public Works of Argentina, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the
United States.
Note: In the case of Argentina, the labor cost is corrected for changes in payroll taxes; vr and vr* are calculated
as the real hourly wages divided by real hourly labor productivity for each country’s manufacturing industry.
13. The relative real unit labor costs (RULC*) for Argentina were calculated as real unit labor costs in
United States manufacturing / real unit labor costs in Argentina manufacturing. Thus, a higher RULC* means
a more devalued long-run peso against the dollar. Since I did not count with adequate data, I decided to leave
out the correction for the tradable/nontradable content of the consumption bundle (τ and τ*) suggested by equa-
tion (2). However, if we followed Shaikh’s suggestion of using the ratio of producer prices to consumer prices
as a proxy of τ and τ* for each country, the main conclusions would not be altered (see Figure 7).
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Therefore, contrary to what is usually believed, the long-run real exchange rate (as
estimated from the evolution of RULC*) increased some 63.4 percent on average between
the eighties and the nineties. In the nineties, a (precarious) triumph of capital allowed it to
engage in a full-blown attack on labor. After years of struggle, capital’s reorganization and
labor class decomposition gave way to a phase of deep social restructuring that allowed for
the huge increase in the long-run real exchange rate. Following Shaikh’s model, the steep
increase in productivity and the direct reduction in labor costs in Argentina relative to the
United States gave way to an important increase in capital’s potential profitability.
However, as I have proposed, the absence of regulating capitals in Argentina precluded the
reduction of prices, and thus the increase in actual profitability (competitiveness).
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Figure 6.
Real Exchange Rate (peso-dollar) and Relative Real Unit Labor Cost (RULC*), 
Argentina (Index number, 1991 = 100)
Source: Elaborated based on official data from the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC), the
Ministry of the Economy and Public Works of Argentina, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United
States.
Note: The RULC* is calculated as vr* / vr. The real exchange rate, RER(ppi), is calculated as explained for
Figure 1.
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While during the eighties, the RULC* remained fairly stable, the actual RER was very
high (the value of the peso was extremely low). This was mainly because of the difficulty
found by capital to control labor and reorganize production. As a matter of fact, during the
eighties, Argentina witnessed one great battle between capital and labor for the control of
social production. The difficulties found by capital to control labor were apparent in its
impossibility to stop labor’s wage demands (directly within the factories or indirectly by
means of state intervention). This difficulty reflected most openly in the process of capital
flight that grew from 15,000 million dollars to more than 43,000 million dollars in the decade
(Basualdo and Kulfas 2000). Since capital could not get a grip on labor, it preferred to fly to
(apparently) more quiet grounds. Besides, at a social level, during the eighties, the debt cri-
sis put an enormous strain on Argentina’s capital accumulation (gross fixed investment fell
at a 1.7 percent yearly rate between 1984 and 1990; see Féliz and Pérez 2004). Capital flight
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Figure 7.
Real Exchange Rate (peso-dollar), Relative Real Unit Labor Cost (RULC*), and RULC* Corrected by
Tradable/Nontradable Content of Consumption Basket, Argentina (Index number, 1991 = 100)
Source: Elaborated based on official data from the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC), the
Ministry of the Economy and Public Works of Argentina, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United
States.
Note: The RULC* is calculated as vr* / vr. The RULC* corrected by the tradable/nontradable content of
the consumption basket (corrected RULC*) was calculated as RULC* times τ*/ τ, where τ* and τ are the
ratios between the producer price index and the consumer price index for the United States and Argentina,
respectively. The real exchange rate, RER(ppi), is calculated as explained for Figure 1.
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in a moment of relative dollar scarcity put great pressure on the foreign exchange markets.14
This process helps explain the extremely high exchange rate that predominated through the
eighties.
In the nineties, on the contrary, capital’s offensive was fed by millions of dollars in
money-capital. The possibility of higher rates of exploitation, and thus (potentially) higher
profit rates, lured financial capital into Argentina. Money-capital continued to enter
Argentina in the light of lower(ing) relative real unit labor costs, and thus growing expected
profit rates.15 However, the regulation of money through convertibility entered into conflict
with the need to actually realize surplus value.
While the relative real unit labor costs were being reduced in Argentina in relation to
the United States, the long-run real exchange rate (RULC*) was increasing to allow for the
equalization of profit rates. However, the actual RER (as measured by ) would not
increase fast enough. With the nominal exchange fixed by law, the pressure to adjust was
put on nominal prices. With real unit labor costs falling, expected profit rates were increas-
ing. Thus, productive capacity and actual production also increased (between 1991 and
1997, real manufacturing production increased by 22.5 percent). Higher production would
not be sold unless there was increased domestic and/or foreign effective demand. However,
growing unemployment of the labor force16 and falling household incomes limited domes-
tic consumption demand, while the fixed exchange rate and slow world-demand growth17
put a lid on foreign demand. In conclusion, deflationary pressures began to build up: by the
year 1997, the annual variation of producer prices had reduced to just 0.1 percent (while,
for example, it was 1.9 percent in the United States). From 1998 onward, producer prices
showed an outright reduction (–5.4 percent from 1998 to 2001).
Falling domestic prices would allow for domestic capitals to increase their market share
in world markets, and thus, realize their higher surplus value in higher profits. But the defla-
tion, which some mainstream economists expected to solve the problem, was extremely dan-
gerous for the circuit of capital as a whole. While the nominal devaluation of the domestic
currency would have allowed for the actual RER to keep up with the evolution of the
RULC*, domestic price deflation could achieve the same objective but at the risk of stalling
the process of expanded reproduction of capital. A growing pressure to reduce prices was a
negative sign for investment (since it would be a signal of falling profitability), and thus for
capital accumulation. Reduced prices meant an immediately reduced cash flow, and thus
greater difficulties to make room for debt payments.18 Cash flow problems would then
e.p∗
p
14. The dollar’s relative scarcity was caused by the United States Federal Reserve’s policy of high interest
rates, which were extremely high by historical standards.
15. Between 1992 and 1998, Argentina received almost 30,000 million dollars in foreign direct investment
(Iñigo Carrera 1999). Besides, local capitals (nonfinancial) received around 14,000 millions dollars through
the issuing of negotiable obligations (Basualdo 2000).
16. Argentina’s general unemployment rate grew from an average of 8.4 percent between 1990 and 1994 to
15.3 percent, on average, from 1995 to 1999 (Pérez 2002).
17. This expressed for Argentina in terms of reduced export prices that, according to the Ministry of the
Economy of Argentina, fell by 12.3 percent between 1991-1997 and between 1998-2002.
18. Debt accumulation by the private sector was also an important problem. While capital was sure that struc-
tural reforms would increase its ability to exploit labor, it happily financed the process. The stock of private debt
grew from 8,600 million dollars in 1991 to 49,500 million dollars in 1997 (Basualdo 2000). However, the accu-
mulation of debt turned into a big problem when it seemed clear that the expanded reproduction of capital would
not be so easy, and the recomposition of the labor class was putting at risk the whole process of reforms.
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translate into trouble for the financial system. Besides, increased exploitation at a country-
wide scale meant a lower participation of labor on value added and a probable reduction on
popular consumption that would act in feedback fashion to increase relative excess supply.
In fact, the participation of wages in total value added dropped from 35.5 percent in 1991 to
just more than 27 percent in 1997.19 To this, I might add the increasing pressure of competi-
tion by capital in Brazil (which had devalued its currency by late 1998), and later, the crisis
in the so-called Asian Tigers and Russia. In this situation, capital pressured for greater reduc-
tions in real unit labor costs and asked for even lower taxes. While from the individual cap-
ital’s point of view, it would make sense to keep reducing unit costs, from the perspective
of productive capital as a whole, it would only add to the already excessive productive
capacity.
In a nutshell, the growing difficulties for the expanded reproduction of capital expressed
the contradiction between capital’s drive for accumulation together with its inner tendency to
reduce the variable (value producing) part of capital; the mounting crisis was the actualiza-
tion (the turning into an actual event) of the tendency for the profit rate to fall.
Besides, by 1998, the labor class had consolidated a new political composition that
would allow it to confront capital with greater success. After more than a decade of defeats,
labor had begun to confront in an organized manner capital’s advances.20
In the factories, labor productivity began to stagnate after several years of pronounced
increases. Labor productivity growth in manufacturing fell from an annual average of 5.7
percent between 1991 and 1997 to just 4 percent a year afterward. This was showing the
growing loss of momentum of the process of reforms in the midst of increasing social and
political turmoil.
Outside capitalists’ enterprises, the labor class had begun to successfully resist neoliberal
reforms. Unemployed workers, state employees, students, petty producers, small farmers, and
peasants, among others, were confronting the state in its attempts to help capital counter the
growing crisis. While capital found greater difficulties in converting surplus value into actual
profits, it demanded from the state a deepening in structural reforms. The struggle for the
reduction in taxes and in public spending (particularly of wages and salaries of public-sector
employees) as well as for further reforms became the new battlefront. If profits could not be
realized in the market, capital’s intent was to obtain them through direct transfers of value by
the state, especially through income tax cuts and further reductions in payroll taxes. However,
a growing public-sector deficit (which reached 2.5 percent of GDP in 2000) and increasing
difficulties in servicing public debt (which, by the year 2000, had reached 51 percent of GDP)
were making it increasingly difficult for the state to give capital a hand.
19. This is my own estimation, based on data from Iñigo Carrera (2001) and Beccaria (1991).
20. The consolidation of new labor organizations that opposed the neoliberal reforms and concentrated their
force in such strategic sectors as the state (mainly, the new Central de los Trabajadores Argentinos, CTA) and
the transport sector (the Movimiento de los Trabajadores Argentinos, MTA) was an important qualitative trans-
formation that consolidated at this time (Battistini, Deledicque, and Féliz 2002). Besides, I should stress the
growing importance of movements of unemployed workers (among them the autonomous Movimiento de
Trabajadores Desocupados Anibal Verón, with several thousand members), of small farmers’ organizations
(such as the MOCASE and APENOC, which grouped more than 10,000 peasant families), and of small busi-
ness organizations (such as APYME), which turned into the most important social forces opposing reforms
(Féliz 2004).
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In the midst of growing difficulties to realize profits and with deflation knocking at the
door, with increasing social and political conflict, capital turned into its most liquid form,
money-capital, and tried to fly out before it was too late. This changed the direction in the
flows of capital as it accelerated the process of adjustment that was threatening to blow
capital away.21 The story after this is well known: banking crisis, loss of reserves, financial
troubles, and so on (see, for example, Mussa 2002). Eventually, capital’s dominant agents
accepted that there was no alternative but to opt out of the convertibility of the currency.
Thus, devaluation of the peso followed. In January 2002, the peso was allowed to float;
from December 2001 to December 2003, the nominal peso value of the United States dol-
lar increased by 198 percent.
It is my understanding that capital took devaluation as the last available choice.
Devaluation was a troublesome option since restructuring had been financed mainly by a
growing external (foreign currency denominated) debt. Accordingly, devaluation meant a
huge redistribution of surplus value. Concentrated capital took a risky bet when it accepted
getting rid of the convertible currency. Growing popular discontent meant that the effects
(social, political, and economic) of devaluation were uncertain; no one knew what the reac-
tion of the workers would be to higher food and fuel prices, what the state’s margin was to
absorb and socialize private sector external debt, and so on. However, standing by the con-
vertibility was, at that moment, a ticking bomb.
Devaluation has caused a further reduction in real wages (–15.95 percent from
December 2001 to December 2003), increasing the RULC*.22 Most importantly, devalua-
tion has generated a change in the measured RER, thus taking it closer to its tendential
level (RULC*). The measured real exchange rate has jumped by 122 percent between
December 2001 and December 2003, more than offsetting the increase in the RULC*
between 1991 and 2001 (51.4 percent).23
I have stated that the crisis was to be expected, since the convertibility regime created
the preconditions for its own demise. However, does this mean that without the convert-
ibility, capital would have been able to avoid the crisis? I believe not, since the convertibil-
ity plan was precisely an integral, if contested, strategy of capital to counter the power of
labor. This program of reforms was in fact successful from capital’s point of view, since it
allowed capital to gain greater control over labor (by restructuring most production
processes). Besides, it gave capital the chance to appropriate new spaces for the valoriza-
tion of value (privatization of social security, privatization of natural resources, greater par-
ticipation in the provision of health and educational services, privatized state enterprises,
etc.). As a result of this process, capital as a whole has not only increased the real subjec-
tion of labor, and thus of society, under its rule, but it has also been able to increase the
21. Between December 2000 and December 2001, total deposits in the financial system fell by 25 percent
(20,000 million dollars), while capital flight (registered in the balance of payments as “net nonfinancial private
sector”) amounted to 12,247 million dollars (Brenta 2002).
22. However, I do not have enough data for years 2002 and 2003 to calculate the actual evolution of
RULC*.
23. The actual real exchange rate is now probably higher than its tendential value. Real devaluation has
turned the current account deficit into an important surplus. However, this has been done on the basis of
reduced imports and a partial default on the external debt, something that will not stand as capital accumula-
tion regains momentum.
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ratio of surplus to necessary labor. This is expressed in increasing productivity of labor,
and correspondingly, as I showed, a rising tendential real exchange rate.
5. Conclusion
Argentina proved to be, during the nineties, the IMF’s most brilliant student. However,
neoliberal reforms did not bring a prolonged period of stability and prosperity but resulted
in the deepest crisis in the country’s history.
However, the crisis did not happen because of capital’s failure to restructure and regain
control over labor through Washington’s consensus-type reforms. It was precisely its suc-
cess that created the preconditions for its own demise.
Capital’s restructuring increased productivity, created new spaces for the valorization
of value (i.e., the expansion of surplus value), and disorganized traditional working class
resistance. This process (re)created, nonetheless, the chronic limitations of dependent cap-
italism. While restructuring allowed for an important increase in labor productivity, and
thus in potential surplus-value, the impossibility of translating such increases into lower
prices, and thus greater profits, created the preconditions for Argentina’s crisis.
The crisis was, then, not caused by labor’s resistance (although it did play an impor-
tant role in the events that led to the end of convertibility) or by Argentina’s capital’s lack
of success in increasing its productivity (Bonnet 2002); on the contrary, it was precisely
the result of capital’s tremendous success. In fact, after devaluation, real wages fell signif-
icantly, showing labor’s difficulties in confronting capital in the new correlation of power.
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